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Abstract This paper offers a predictive mechanism to derive the presuppositions of
verbs. The starting point is the intuition, dating back at least to Stalnaker 1974, that
the information conveyed by a sentence that is in some sense independent from its
main point is presupposed. The contribution of this paper is to spell out a mechanism
for deciding what will become the main point of the sentence and how to calculate
independence. It is proposed that this can be calculated by making reference to
event times. As a very rough approximation, the main point of an utterance is what
(in a sense to be defined) has to be about the event time of the matrix predicate and
the information that the sentence conveys but is not (or does not have to be) about
the event time of the matrix predicate is presupposed. The notion of aboutness used
to calculate independence is based on Demolombe & Fariñas del Cerro 2000.
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1 Introduction
Why do verbs give rise to the presuppositions they do? One possibility, which has
been the prevailing attitude in the presupposition literature, is that this question
might not have an answer, and for a principled reason: the presuppositionality of
verbs (and indeed any expression) is simply an arbitrary lexical property. This idea
was implicitly captured by the term conventional implicature of Karttunen & Peters
(1975, 1979), and has been inherited by much of the research on presuppositions.
Thus it is usually assumed that while the lexicon specifies, e.g., that know has to
presuppose its complement, there is no similar lexical specification for believe.
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Triggering verbal presuppositions
There are reasons however to be dissatisfied with this answer. First, as was
pointed out by Levinson & Annamalai (1992) and Simons (2001), if presuppositions
were simply conventional, they should manifest the property of detachability, i.e. it
should be easy to find pairs of expressions which share their truth conditions, but
differ in their presuppositional behavior. However, it seems that words that express
a similar meaning trigger a similar presupposition. Thus (1a) and its synonyms in
(1b) all seem to imply that John indeed used to smoke.
(1) a. Has John stopped smoking?
b. Has John quit/finished/given up/ceased smoking?
Such examples show that there is a generalization to be captured about what type
of meaning can give rise to what type of presuppositions. But they are entirely
mysterious given a conventional view of presupposition triggering.
Second, as was argued by Levinson & Annamalai (1992), if presuppositions
were purely conventional elements of the non-truth conditional meaning, one would
expect there to be translation difficulties and conceptual mismatch when comparing
the presuppositional items of different languages. But this is generally not the case.
Levinson & Annamalai (1992) offer a detailed comparison of English and Tamil and
show that the presupposition triggers in these two unrelated languages are exactly
parallel. Such facts argue that presuppositions should follow somehow from the
content of presupposition triggers.
Yet how presuppositions could be predicted from the meaning of triggers has been
an elusive and rarely-addressed question. While the few attempts in the literature
to explain presuppositions of at least certain items provided valuable insights (cf.
Sperber & Wilson 1979, Simons 2001, and Abusch 2002, 2010), they either did not
make correct predictions or failed to be sufficiently explanatory. Stalnaker (1974)
and Schlenker (2010) laid out a blueprint for a triggering mechanism, but did not
provide a theory themselves.
This paper offers a predictive mechanism to derive the presuppositions of verbs.
The starting point is the intuition, dating back at least to Stalnaker (1974), that the
information conveyed by a sentence that is in some sense independent from its main
point is presupposed. The contribution of this paper is to spell out a mechanism
for deciding what will become the main point of the sentence and how to calculate
independence. It is proposed that this can be calculated by making reference to event
times. As a very rough approximation, the main point of an utterance is what (in a
sense to be defined) has to be about the event time of the matrix predicate and the
information that the sentence conveys but is not (or does not have to be) about the
event time of the matrix predicate is presupposed. The notion of aboutness used to
calculate independence will be that of Demolombe & Fariñas del Cerro (2000).
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2 Aboutness
The notion of aboutness that I use in this paper is a straightforward extension in
terms of possible worlds of the notion of being about an argument worked out by
Demolombe & Fariñas del Cerro (2000) for first order logic. (Cf. the Appendix for
a summary of Demolombe & Fariñas del Cerro’s (2000) ideas.) The proposal has
two parts: the definition of variants of a possible world with respect to an object and
the definition of being about an object.
2.1 Variants
We define variants of possible worlds with respect to objects. Roughly speaking,
two worlds w and w′ are c-variants if they only differ by the properties of the
object denoted by c. In this case we need to allow that c-variants differ in the truth
assignment to atomic sentences where the expression c appears as an argument of
the matrix clause. Let M be a model 〈W,D,R,[[ ]]〉, where W is a set of possible
worlds, D is a domain of individuals, R⊆W ×W is an accessibility relation on W
and [[pn]]w ⊆ Dn, for any non-logical atomic predicate pn.
For the purpose of calculating variants, a sentence such as a knows that p at t
will be treated as if it had the more simple syntax K(a)(t), where K stands for knows
that p. The language is assumed not to contain the identity predicate. We can then
define for every possible world w ∈W , variants w′ of w as follows:
• Dw′ = Dw
• [[x]]w
′
= [[x]]w, for each constant or variable symbol x
• if p is a predicate symbol of arity n:
– if t is an n+1-tuple the first n terms of which are from D of Lc and
the final element is from W and which contains no occurrence of the
constant c, then 〈[[t]], w’ 〉∈ [[p]] iff 〈[[t]], w 〉∈ [[p]].
– if an element 〈d1, ...,dn〉 of Dn is such that for every j in [1,n],d j 6= [[c]],
then 〈d1, ...,dn〉 ∈ [[p]]w′ iff 〈d1, ...,dn〉 ∈ [[p]]w.
2.2 Aboutness
Given the above notion of variants, let’s define aboutness as follows:
(2) Aboutness
A sentence S is about the object denoted by the constant symbol c iff there are
two worlds w and w′ in W which are c-variants and [[S]]w = 1 and [[S]]w′ = 0
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Conversely, it is also possible to give a definition of what it means for a sentence to
not be about an object c:
(3) The property of not-being about
A sentence S is not about the object denoted by the constant symbol c iff for
every w, w′ in W st. w and w′ are c-variants [[S]]w= [[S]]w′ .
2.3 Examples
The sentence S = Fido is tired is about Fido iff there are two Fido-variants w, w′, st.
[[S]]w = 1 and [[S]]w
′
= 0. Notice that the definition in (2) quantifies over all worlds,
therefore the entailment ϕ of S that Some individual is tired is also about Fido,
because there are two worlds w, w′ which differ only in the properties of Fido and
[[ϕ]]w = 1 and [[ϕ]]w′ = 0, e.g. if Fido is the only tired individual in w. In general,
sentences expressing existential quantification are about every individual. Similarly,
a sentence expressing universal quantification is also about every individual in the
domain. Suppose our sentence was Every individual is tired. Now we can find
two worlds which differ solely in the properties of Fido, st. one of these makes
the sentence true and the other false: world w in which every individual is in the
denotation of the predicate tired, and another world w′ in which every individual
except Fido is in this set. Finally, observe that the sentence Fido is tired or Fido is
not tired (=ψ) is not about Fido according to the definition above: This is because
since ψ is a tautology, it is true in every world.
3 The proposal: some core examples
I follow Stalnaker (1974) in assuming that presuppositions are also part of the
entailed meaning. Presuppositions are simply entailments that are in some way
distinguished. In this framework a presupposition triggering mechanism can be
viewed as a function that takes as its input the bivalent meaning of a sentence S, and
outputs one or more entailments of S, those which are also presupposed.
The main intuition behind this paper, similarly to that in Stalnaker 1974, is
that entailments of a sentence that are in some sense independent from the main
point of the sentence are presupposed. The main point of a sentence is given by
those entailments that are by nature about the event time of the matrix predicate.1
Propositions that describe events that are not (or do not have to be) about the event
time of the matrix predicate of S are independent, and hence presupposed.
1 A predecessor of this idea can also be found in Abbott (2000) who claims that “[t]ypically, the
asserted proposition in an utterance will correspond to the main clause of the uttered sentence”. But
Abbott does not give further clarifications on this point or present a triggering mechanism.
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To calculate this, I will introduce the notion of a canonical temporal represen-
tation of a sentence.2 Canonical temporal representations of sentences (CT(S)) are
sentences in which the independent tense argument positions of predicates are filled
by choosing any constant of the appropriate type. Let’s call the temporal arguments
replaced with new constants during the construction of CT(S) representations TS-
arguments, and the constants that replace them CTS-arguments. We can now define
the CT(S)-equivalent of an entailment p of S as follows:
(4) The CT(S)-equivalent p′ of an entailment p of S (abbreviated p =CTS p′) is
a. p itself, if (the linguistic form of) p does not contain TS-arguments
b. if p contains TS-arguments, then p′ is the proposition that p can be
turned into by replacing its TS-arguments with the corresponding CTS-
arguments.
The triggering mechanism predicts an entailment p of S to be presupposed if it has
a CT(S)-equivalent proposition p′ that is not about the event time of the matrix
predicate of CT(S).
(5) The triggering mechanism for verbal presuppositions
An entailment p of S is presupposed if S has a CT(S) representation such that
the CT(S)-equivalent of p is not about the event time of the matrix predicate
of CT(S).
3.1 Background assumptions
I assume that event times denote salient intervals whose value is assigned by the
context. As such, they are rather like pronouns (cf. Partee 1973). For convenience
the tense argument is represented in the syntax as well. I use a type-theoretical
system which in addition to the basic types e and t contains a type i whose domain
is the set of time intervals. In this system predicates have an extra argument slot for
time, thus what are usually assumed to be one place predicates such as intransitive
verbs are going to be two place predicates, taking an individual and a time argument:
(6) [[is tired]]w,g=λ t i.λxe. x is tired at t in w
Tense morphemes are time variables that saturate the time argument slot of predi-
cates. The denotation of this variable is given by the assignment function g supplied
by the context, which assigns it an element from the domain of time intervals. E.g.
the sentence John is tired at t2 is true iff John is tired at the time assigned to t2 by g.
2 I thank E. Chemla for suggesting (p.c.) to try to run the triggering mechanism on a more abstract
representation than the sentence itself, to avoid the problems of a previous version of this proposal.
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That is, whatever the value of t2, it denotes the time of John being tired.
From the syntactic representation of sentences we can now create canonical
temporal representations of sentences (CT(S)). These are sentences in which the
independent tense argument positions of predicates are filled by choosing any con-
stant of the appropriate type. The identity of the constants chosen for canonical
representations is not relevant, except that the time they refer to should exist in
the model. Thus in canonical representations of sentences accidental co-temporal
relations might be destroyed, although some lexically specified co-indexing relations
have to be preserved, cf. Section 3.4.3 Cf. some examples of CT(S) representations
below:
(7) a. John sees Bill (at time t1)
CT(S): sees (John,Bill,t)
b. John believes (at time t1) that he is tired (at time t1)
CT(S): believes(John, tired(John,t’),t)
c. John hopes (at time t1) to be promoted (at time t1)
CT(S): hopes(John, promoted(John,t’),t)
d. John stopped smoking (at time t1)
CT(S): stopped (John, smoking, t)
I will call the temporal arguments replaced with new constants during the construc-
tion of CT(S) representations TS-arguments, and the constants that replace them
CTS-arguments. The former are represented using subscripts, and the latter by
primes.
3.2 Factive presuppositions
This section spells out how factive presuppositions can be derived. The example I
look at in detail is the verb know, but it will be shown that the same analysis carries
over to the whole class of factive verbs. Some other members of this class in English
include realize, discover, notice, recognize, find out, remember, forget, be aware that,
admit and a subclass of sensory factives sense, see, smell, hear, detect, observe. A
major subclass of factive verbs is the class of emotives, factive verbs used primarily
to convey the subject’s emotional attitude towards information. This class includes
3 Another case where a dependency between two tenses has to be assumed is the case of (restrictive)
relative clauses, where the CTS representation will have to use the same variable in the relative
clause and the matrix clause. This is not unnatural considering that temporal dependencies in clausal
complements and relative clauses are generally different. A well-known example is the sequence of
tense phenomenon, which shows wildly different properties in embedded relative clauses and clausal
complements.
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predicates such as regret, be annoyed, be upset, be glad, be happy.4
Suppose that our sentence S is the following example:
(8) a. S: John knows (at time t1) that Mary is tired (at time t1)
b. CT(S): know (John, t, tired (Mary, t ′))
Let K be the set of all the propositions that (8a) entails (∩K = S). Intuitively, there
are two types of entailments in K: logical entailments, and entailments that can be
derived from the meaning of S. I will call the second type of entailment lexical
entailment, but this name should not be taken to imply that this type of entailment
is necessarily encoded in the lexical meaning of words. Lexical entailments are
not given in a formal way: they are only available to speakers by inspecting their
intuitions about the lexical meaning of predicates and the meaning of S itself. Lexical
entailments express restrictions about which possible worlds are in W, rendering
some worlds ‘impossible’. Eg. the fact that ‘x believes p’ is a lexical entailment of
‘x knows that p’ is the restriction that there is no world in W in which ‘x knows that
p’ is true, but ‘x believes that p’ is false.
If we only looked at logical entailments, not taking the restrictions on possible
worlds imposed by lexical entailments into account, then if S is about a matrix time
t, and S is atomic, then its non-tautological logical entailments are also about t.5
Here is why. If the elements of W are assumed to be derived via the combinatorial
possibilities of the elements in the language, and Q is not a tautology, there is a
w that makes [[S]]w=0 and [[Q]]w=0. Since S is about t, and there are no necessary
connections among predicates, there is a possible world corresponding to every
possible combination of predicates and arguments, and so there is a t-variant w’ of
w st. and [[S]]w
′
=1. Since S entails Q, [[Q]]w
′
=1. Thus no non-tautological logical
entailment is predicted to be presupposed. Tautological entailments of S are predicted
to be presupposed, as these are not about the matrix time, but this is harmless.
Thus it is not necessary to look at purely logical entailments of S at all to find
presuppositions. However, we need to look separately at lexical entailments, because
given the restrictions that these impose on the set W, it is now possible that no
t-variants w and w’ can be found such that for a given lexical entailment Q, [[Q]]w=0
and [[Q]]w
′
=1. The reason is that if a sentence P(a) lexically entails some other
sentence P(b), there are no worlds in which P(a) is true but P(b) is false. Therefore
the above reasoning will not go through any more. This means that we need to
consider lexical entailments one by one, and check if they are about the matrix time t
4 I assume thus that emotive factive verbs such as regret are just like cognitive factives in presupposing
the truth of their complement, in accordance with Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970), Karttunen (1971),
Gazdar (1979) and in contrast with Klein (1975), Egré (2008), Schlenker (2003).
5 Thanks to T. Williamson (pc.) for helping me to see that an older, more complicated reasoning about
logical entailments was neither necessary nor correct.
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or not. (But notice that lexical entailments are not equivalences, so it is still possible
to show that that S itself is about its matrix predicate.)
Let’s return to example (8a). Lexical entailments are not given in a formal way:
they are only available to speakers to by inspecting their intuitions about the lexical
meaning of predicates and the sentences composed from these predicates. Below is
a list of some intuitively plausible lexical entailments of (8a).
(9) Some lexical entailments of John knows at t1 that Mary is tired at t1
a. ϕ = John knows at t1 that Mary is tired at t1
b. ψ = John believes at t1 that Mary is tired at t1
c. χ = Mary is tired at t1
d. ξ = John’s belief is justified at t1
NB: It is not claimed here that a sentence such as (8a) can be ‘factorized’ into
its constituent lexical entailments, nor is it assumed that there is a solution to the
equation John knows that p= John believes that p ∧ p ∧ X. (cf. e.g. Williamson
2002, Yablo 2008 etc. on the dangers of such an assumption.) The only claim made
is that speakers have intuitive access to plausible lexical entailments. The above list
merely provides examples of such entailments and is not meant to be an exhaustive
definition of the meaning of S.
Which of the above lexical entailments, if any, are predicted to be presupposed?
Here is the idea. Let’s take a CT(S) representation of (10) (given in (10a)) such that
t1, t and t ′ all refer to non-overlapping intervals. The complement of know, which
denotes the proposition that it is raining, is entailed by S. Since the CT(S) equivalent
of this entailment is not about the matrix event time t of CT(S), it is predicted to be
presupposed.
(10) S: John knows (at t1) [that Mary is tired (at time t1.)]
a. CT(S): knows (John, tired(Mary, t ′), t)
b. S |= tired (Mary, t1)
c. tired(Mary, t1) = CTS tired(Mary, t ′)
d. tired(Mary, t ′) is not about t (by (2))
e. therefore, S presupposes that Mary is tired at t1.
Compare this with the entailment of S that John believes that it is raining. This
proposition is not predicted to be presupposed, because its corresponding CT(S)-
entailment is necessarily about the matrix event time of its CT(S):
(11) S: John knows (at t1) [that Mary is tired (at time t1.)]
a. CT(S): knows (John, tired(Mary, t ′), t)
b. S |= believes (John, t1, Mary is tired (at t1)).
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c. believes (John, t1, tired (Mary, t1)) =CTS believes (John, t, tired(Mary,t’))
d. believes (John, t, tired(Mary, t ′)) is about the event time t
e. therefore S does not presuppose that John believes that Mary is tired at
t1
It seems that no other entailment in (9) is such that its CTS-equivalent would not be
about t. But if we found other lexical entailments whose CTS-equivalents would not
be about the event time of some CT(S), these entailments would also be predicted to
be presupposed. (Cf. section 3.5)
Notice that existential entailments that we get by replacing the matrix tense argu-
ment in the original sentence by an existentially bound tense variable are predicted
to be about the matrix tense of the CT(S). This is because existentially-quantified
sentences are about every individual in the domain (cf. section 2.3). Thus for any
CT(S), the CTS-equivalent of the existential entailment is be about the matrix CTS-
argument as well. Therefore this entailment is not predicted to be presupposed.6
Existential entailments are one of the main reasons why Demolombe & Fariñas del
Cerro’s (2000) system of aboutness is used in this paper.
3.3 Change of state verbs
The section looks at regular change of state verbs such as stop. As in the previous
discussion, the reasoning presented in connection with these predicates will carry
over to the whole class of change of state predicates.7
As was argued above, to predict which entailments of the sentence will be
presupposed we only need to consider the set of lexical entailments. Consider (12),
in which t1 denotes the event time of the predicate, in this case the time of the
stopping. Let’s assume that the lexical entailments of (12) are ϕ , ψ and χ:
(12) John stopped smoking at t1
a. ϕ = John does not smoke at t1
b. ψ = John smoked at t2 (where t2 is some contextually-given interval
before t1)
c. χ = John stopped smoking at t1
The event time of S is denoted by t1. Its denotation is given by the contextually
supplied assignment function g, which assigns it an element from the domain of
6 In the case of sentences such as John knows that sometimes he is tired, it has to be assumed that the
the CT(S) construction mechanism replaces the temporal adverb itself.
7 Cognitive change of state verbs such as discover work on the one hand as regular change of state
verbs (presupposing the truth of a previous state), and on the other hand as factive verbs (having a
factive presupposition).
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time intervals. In this example, the event time denotes the interval that starts just
before the onset of non-smoking, and goes on for a certain, potentially very short
time. In some other cases, it might be reasonable to assume that the event time also
includes a longer segment of the stage where the previous activity is still going on.
This second option might be more intuitive with gradual transitions, e.g. stop the
car. However, even in this second case the sentence also entails that the previous
state held before the event time. Notice that this contrasts with the inference that
the final state continues to hold, which is not an entailment. This is shown by the
difference in the acceptability of the examples in (13) below.
(13) a. #John stopped smoking, but he has never smoked before.
b. John stopped smoking, but then he started again.
In the case of factive verbs it was the canonical temporal representation of the
sentence that allowed the event time of the embedded clause to be different from that
of the matrix event time, and thus presupposed. In the case of change of state verbs
some entailments are lexically specified to be true at some time other than the event
time. This is what happens in (12), where the the lexical entailment that John used
to smoke at some time preceding the event time comes from the lexical semantics
of the change of state verb. As the CT(S) equivalent of this entailment is itself, and
thus not necessarily about the event time of CT(S), it is presupposed.
(14) a. S: John stopped smoking (at t1).
b. CT(S): stopped (John, smoke, t)
c. S |= smoke(j, t2), where t2 refers to some time interval preceding t1
d. smoke( j, t2)=CTS smoke(j, t2) (because t2 is not a TS-argument)
e. smoke( j, t2) is not about t (at least for some CT(S))
f. therefore, S presupposes that John used to smoke
The rest of the lexical entailments in (12) are all about t1, and thus their CTS-
equivalent will be about t. Since the closure of lexical entailments under logical
consequence does not introduce any new presuppositions, no other entailments of
(12) are predicted to be presupposed.
One might wonder about the entailment that John smoked at some time t2 before
t1. This proposition is technically about the arguments, according to the definition
of aboutness. Doesn’t it express an equivalent proposition to (12b)? Since possible
worlds are defined by the combinatorial possibilities in the language, they in fact
do not express logically equivalent propositions. The two might be contextually
equivalent, there is nothing however in the present system that would prohibit some
proposition entailed by a sentence S to be a presupposition, while a contextually
equivalent proposition is not.
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3.4 Implicative verbs
As Karttunen (1971) has showed, implicative predicates such as manage, remember,
see fit are veridical, but they do not presuppose their complement. This would be a
problem for the present proposal if we assumed that the temporal argument of the
embedded clause can be replaced by a different CTS argument from the one that
replaces the matrix CTS argument, because in that case the proposal would predict
that (14) should presuppose the truth of its embedded complement.8
(15) a. John managed to solve the problem.
b. John saw fit to apologize.
c. John remembered to lock the door.
However, as Karttunen shows, in these cases the tense of the embedded predicate
is not independent of the matrix tense, as it cannot be modified by independent
temporal adverbials:
(16) a. #John managed to solve the problem next week.
b. #John saw fit to arrive day after tomorrow.
c. #John remembered to lock his door tomorrow.
The above facts contrast with other veridical predicates that combine with infinitival
clauses, where such modification is available:
(17) John was happy to arrive tomorrow.
This means that in the case of implicative verbs the temporal argument of the
embedded clause is keyed to the tense of the matrix verb, and therefore it cannot
be replaced by a new constant when the CTS is computed. One way to implement
this idea is to assume that the lexical semantics of implicatives specifies that the
tense argument of the embedded clause is obligatorily co-indexed with the tense
argument of the matrix clause. This is similar to the treatment of the controlled
subject of embedded infinitival clauses, which also has to be co-indexed with the
matrix subject:
(18) Johni managed tj [PROi solve the problem tj]
The CTS construction mechanism now cannot replace the embedded tense argument
with a new constant: it has to be replaced with the same constant as the one that
replaces the matrix tense. As a result, the embedded complement will not be
predicted to be presupposed by the present system.
8 Thanks to Jacopo Romoli and Kyle Rawlins (pc.) for bringing this issue to my attention.
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3.5 Sortal presuppositions: adding common knowledge
The triggering mechanism proposed in the previous sections was viewed as a function
that takes as its input the bivalent meaning of a sentence S, and outputs one or more
entailments of S. This section looks at cases that might necessitate casting a wider
net. In certain cases at least, the input to the triggering mechanism is not only the set
of entailments of the literal meaning of a sentence S, but the set of entailments of S
given general common knowledge.
Suppose we added the entailment (19b), as seems reasonable, to the set of lexical
entailments of (19a):
(19) a. John knows that Mary is tired at t1
b. John is sentient at t1
According to our rules, the CTS equivalent of (19b) is about the matrix event time of
the CT(S) representation of (19a). Thus (19b) is not predicted to be a presupposition.
However it was argued in the literature (cf. Simons 2001, e.g.) that the proposi-
tion that John is sentient is in fact a presupposition of sentences such as (19a). Indeed
it seems that selectional restrictions in general should be treated as presuppositions
(cf. McCawley 1968, Magidor 2007 and Asher 2010 for recent discussions). Fur-
ther, as most if not all sortal presuppositions are about the event time of the matrix
predicate, it looks as if our system is unable to generate sortal presuppositions.
We might ask however whether (19b) itself corresponds to the sortal presuppo-
sition of S. It seems more likely that the true sortal presupposition of S is not the
episodic statement in (19b), but rather the characterizing statement in (20).
(20) John is sentient (in general)
Is (20) itself a lexical entailment of (19a)? It is hard to tell, but we might safely
assume that at least it is an entailment of (19b) given common knowledge (cf. Magri
2009). I.e. given world knowledge, speakers can be expected to assume that if John
is sentient at a certain time t, then he is sentient in general. Given this it is also safe
to say that (20) is an entailment of (19a) given common knowledge. The present
proposal does predict (20), the contextual entailment of (19a) to be a presupposition.
This is because characterizing statements such as the above are typically assumed
(cf. Chierchia 1995) to contain an instance of the generic operator Gen:
(21) Gen s [C( j,s)] [sentient ( j,s)]
The variable C in the restriction of Gen expresses the property of being at an
arbitrary location. Thus (21) expresses that whenever John might be located in some
situation s, he is a sentient being in s. For our present purposes, I will simplify the
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above by saying that the Davidsonian argument simply ranges over times t. Generic
statements cannot be simply equated with universal quantification because they
allow exceptions. Thus (22), but not (23) is contradicted by the existence of some
after-dinner time at which John does not smoke.
(22) John smokes after dinner
Gen t [after-dinner(t)∧ C( j,t)] [smokes ( j,t)]
(23) John always smokes after dinner
∀t [after-dinner(t)∧ C( j,t)] [smokes ( j,t)]
Recall from section 2.3 that according to our definitions universal statements are
about every individual. By the same reasoning the universal statement in (23) above
is about every individual in the domain. However, as was argued above, generic
statements are not equivalent to universal statements about times t in a given domain.
The CTS equivalent of the contextually entailed generic statement is itself. But we
cannot conclude that a generic statement such as (20) is about the event time of the
CT(S). So while the CTS equivalent of the entailment (24a) is about the event time
of the CT(S) of (19a), and is therefore not presupposed, the contextually entailed
generic statement in (24b) cannot be proved to be about the matrix event time of the
CT(S) of (19a), and is therefore presupposed.
(24) a. John is sentient at t1
b. John is sentient (in general)
Sortal presuppositions of a sentence S can then be predicted by the present system
as presuppositions that arise from the set of entailments of S given by common
knowledge.9
3.6 Adding contextual entailments
The triggering mechanism as presented so far takes general common knowledge into
account, as argued in section 3.5, but otherwise it is not sensitive to the context in
which the sentence appears. This is in contrast with Stalnaker (1974) and Simons
(2001) who assume that the triggering mechanism is a pragmatic mechanism op-
erating on complex sentences, and also with Schlenker (2010) who argues that the
triggering mechanism should be sensitive to both the linguistic and extralinguistic
context in which the expression triggering the presupposition appears. This last
section considers a possible extension, whereby the triggering mechanism might
9 Similar considerations might apply to the presuppositions of verbs such as manage, whose presup-
position might be argued to express a dispositional statement as well: John managed to solve the
exercise presupposes that the exercise is hard for John (in general).
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operate on a set contextually specified entailments. Thus the system can predict
presuppositions not only based on the meaning of the expressions involved, but
based on the literal meaning of the expressions together with the linguistic and
extra-linguistic context in which these expressions appear.
Schlenker (2010, 2008) argues that there are expressions, which he terms ‘part-
time triggers’, that trigger a presupposition only when they appear in certain contexts.
An example is the verb announce. In some contexts, it does not entail the truth of its
complement and in these contexts it does not presuppose the truth of its complement
either. In other contexts, it entails and presupposes the truth of its complement:
(25) Mary has announced that she is pregnant
a. Mary is 30 years old and she is expected to be reliable.
(The context entails the truth of the embedded proposition.)
→ (25) presupposes that Mary is pregnant
b. Mary is 7 years old and is not expected to be reliable.
(The context does not entail the truth of the embedded proposition.)
→ (25) does not presuppose that Mary is pregnant
As Schlenker points out, the verb announce contrasts minimally with the verb inform,
which seems to lexically entail and presuppose the truth of its complement in the
above context. The mechanism proposed in this paper can be extended to handle
the above facts. What is needed is to allow contextual entailments to enter the pool
of candidate entailments for presuppositions. Then if the embedded proposition is
contextually entailed, it is also predicted to be presupposed. Otherwise it isn’t.
4 Discussion
4.1 Predictions
In general the theory makes the prediction that verbs that entail the truth of their
propositional complement will also presuppose the truth of this complement, unless
it is lexically specified by the matrix verb that the tense argument of the embedded
complement has to be coindexed with the matrix tense. This is because there will
always be a CT(S) representation such that the CTS-equivalent corresponding to the
proposition denoted by the complement is not about the event time of the CT(S).
The difference then between a factive verb such as know and a non-factive one such
as believe reduces to the fact that the latter do not entail that their complement is
true, i.e. their veridicality.
Further, the system makes the prediction that any entailment that does not
contain a matrix TS-argument and whose tense argument is not quantified over is
presupposed. Conversely, entailments of a sentence S whose temporal argument is the
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TS-argument corresponding to the matrix CTS argument of the CTS representation
are not predicted to be presupposed. Therefore presuppositions of change of state
verbs are predicted to be about some time other than the event time of a change of
state verb. Further, it is also predicted that entailments of change of state verbs that
are not about the event time cannot be not presupposed. Recall that the inference we
might get from stop that the final state continues to hold is not itself an entailment,
as was shown in (13).
Also, it is generally predicted that entailments of atomic sentences that are not
about the event time will be presupposed. An example might be the sentence with
the simple transitive predicate kill such as (26). Some plausible lexical entailments
might be ϕ , ψ and ξ as shown below.
(26) John killed Bill
a. ϕ = John killed Bill at t1
b. ψ = Bill is dead at t1
c. χ = Bill was alive at t2 (where t2 refers to some time before t1)
Among the above, χ is not about t1. This means that for any CT(S), χ’s CTS-
equivalent will be itself and therefore it will be possible to find CT(S) representations
such that χ is not about their event time. Notice again the contrast between the
entailment of (26) that Bill was alive at t2 and the inference that Bill continued to be
dead after the event time of the killing. While the first is indeed a lexical entailment,
the second is only a pragmatic inference that follows from our world knowledge.
The present theory predicts presuppositions based on the meaning of atomic
sentences and predicates. But it is a separate question of why predicates happen
to entail what they entail, for example why know but not believe happens to be
veridical. Answering this second question would mean giving a general theory of
concept formation.
4.2 Symmetric pairs?
This paper also predicts that atomic sentences that have the same meaning should
trigger the same presuppositions, which seems largely correct. Some examples
in the literature might seem though to challenge this prediction. Fillmore (1971)
argued that there was a near-symmetry between the predicates accuse-criticize, in
that ‘a accused b of p′ presupposed that a judged the action denoted by p bad, and
asserted that b did p, ‘a criticized b for p′ presupposed that b did p and asserted
that a indicated that p was bad. As was pointed by e.g. Sperber & Wilson (1979),
these two verbs are not actually synonymous. Another such pair was put forth by
Abusch (2002, 2010). She has argued that the pairs be right-be aware are symmetric
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in the following way: A sentence such as John is right that dinner is ready asserts
the truth of its complement and presupposes that John believes that dinner is ready,
while the sentence John is aware that dinner is ready asserts that John believes that
dinner is ready and presupposes its complement. As pointed out in Schlenker 2008,
2010, however, it seems that syntactically the two do not behave alike, and that the
sentence John is right that dinner is ready is syntactically more complex, akin to
John is right in claiming that dinner is ready. If these arguments are on the right
track, to date no really convincing cases of symmetric pairs have been found.
APPENDIX: Demolombe and Fariñas del Cerro (2000)
The intuitive idea of Demolombe & Fariñas del Cerro (2000) is that the truth value
of a sentence that is not about an entity should not change if we change the truth
value of the facts about that entity. To capture this intuition, they first introduce
the notion of variants of an interpretation with respect to an object. Given this, the
property of a sentence being about an object can be defined.
The set of variants of an interpretation with regard to an object denoted by
constant symbol c is the set of interpretations Mc that only differ from M by the truth
assignment of atomic sentences where c appears as an argument. Let Lc be a first
order predicate calculus language that contains the constant c and does not contain
the identity predicate.10 M’ is a c-variant of a model M iff it meets the constraints
listed below:
• DM’=DM
• iM’=iM, for every variable symbol and constant symbol
• iM’ is defined from iM for each predicate symbol as follows: if p is a predicate
symbol of arity n
– if t is an n-tuple of terms of language Lc that contain no occurrence of
the constant symbol c, then iM’(t)∈ iM’(p) iff iM(t)∈ iM(p).
– if an element 〈d1, ...,dn〉 of Dn is such that for every j in [1,n], dj 6=
iM(c), then 〈d1, ...,dn〉 ∈ iM’(p) iff 〈d1, ...,dn〉 ∈ iM(p).
Mc will be used to denote the set of c-variant interpretations M’ defined from M.
Aboutness can be defined as follows. Let F be a sentence of language Lc. F is
not about an object named by the constant symbol c iff for every interpretation M,
M |= F iff for every interpretation M’ in Mc M′ |= F :
10 Though cf. Demolombe & Fariñas del Cerro (2000) for some suggestions on how the identity
predicate could be handled.
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(27) NA(F,c) holds iff ∀M(M |= F iff ∀M′ ∈Mc M′ |= F)
A formula F is about an object named by c if it is not the case that NA(F,c):
(28) A(F,c) holds iff ∃M(∃M′ ∈Mc(M |= F and M′ 6|= F))
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